

ICNAP XIII

Corpus Crisis

June 1-3, 2022

Hosted online by:

The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center
Duquesne University



INTERDISCIPLINARY COALITION OF
NORTH AMERICAN PHENOMENOLOGISTS



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The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA

Featured Husserliana Session:

Husserl's Research Manuscript:

"The Paradox of the Psychological Reduction.

The Antinomy of the Psychological Epoché.

The Contradiction Between the Worldliness of the Psychologist and the Psychological World-Epoché, which He Requires Methodologically," translated by Sebastian Luft

The Husserliana session this year is a workshop focusing on a text that Michael Barber introduced at last year's ICNAP conference and newly translated by Sebastian Luft: *The Paradox of the Psychological Reduction. The Antinomy of the Psychological Epoché. The Contradiction Between the Worldliness of the Psychologist and the Psychological World-Epoché, Which He Requires Methodologically* (Hua. XXXIV, pp. 125-147). The translated text, written by Husserl in 1931 and 1932, is available for all conference registrants. The workshop will be offered in two sessions, opening the conference on Wednesday June 1 and Friday June 3. In each session, three scholars will give presentations on the text and three scholars will discuss the presentations. In each session, there will be a Round Table session in which all twelve participants will discuss the text, the presentations, and comments with the audience. The Round Table discussion will be continued into a half hour break (for lunch, dinner) for those interested.

Husserl's text focuses on the method of phenomenological psychology, which follows from the essence of the psychological, something Husserl struggled with his entire career. More broadly, this issue is embedded in the problem of the relationship between philosophy and psychology, indeed transcendental phenomenology and the positive sciences, among which Husserl considered psychology "the decisive field." For ICNAP this problem is especially significant because Husserl considered psychology not merely the science of individual mental life but as foundational for the cultural/human sciences--such sciences of persons as anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, history, and even the humanities--theology and investigations into art, architecture, literature, technology, and cultural objects/institutions. Closely related to this "paradox" is also the problem of psychologism and more generally relativism as well as the securing of an absolute ground for philosophy, indeed the relation of the transcendental philosophy to mundane life.

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INTERDISCIPLINARY COALITION OF
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ICNAP XIII: *Corpus Crisis*

The meeting's grammatically suspect dictum, *corpus crisis*, is meant in its multiple resonances and acknowledges the world-historical crisis of the pandemic as the background of its thirteenth meeting. *Corpus Crisis* signals and troubles the body and bodies in phenomenology. It indexes the many disciplines that constitute the phenomenological field and focuses on the question of whose body or what 'kinds' of embodiment are included in the phenomenological tradition and practice. Correlatively, *corpus crisis* signifies the possibility of phenomenology to be more phenomenological; in relation to and in redress of historically sedimented social and political injustices. To be sure, *corpus crisis* consciously brings Husserl's *Crisis* to mind and echoes with his prescience by way of an invitation to reconsider and specify the contribution of his thought in our time. ICNAP XIII has crafted three key features to anchor the meeting: a keynote address, a featured panel, and our Husserliana-focused portion of the program.

Current ICNAP Executive Committee

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Sebastian Luft
Tom Nenon
Fred Wertz

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Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA
Jeffrey McCurry, Director

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Next Conference:

ICNAP XIV

Summer 2023, in person

Phenomenology of Affect

Hosted by

Center for Phenomenological Psychology and Aesthetics

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

<https://psychology.ku.dk/cppa/>

Conference will be in the beginning of June, 2023; specific dates to be announced.

The 14th annual meeting in the Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists will evolve around the phenomenology of affect. Affect has been a central theme of enquiry throughout the history of phenomenology. As the coloring of our experiences, it figures closely with phenomena such as embodiment, aesthetics, judgment, ethics, and social justice. By its vast range of expressions, affect relates to various disciplines and practices within phenomenology. We invite participants to engage with questions relating to the phenomenology of affect such as: How can we describe affects and their variations, how do they emerge, how does affect relate to action, agency, art, embodiment, and imagination?

The conference will take place at **Center for Phenomenological Psychology and Aesthetics at University of Copenhagen**, which has a long and rich history of phenomenology. Psychologists such as Edgar Rubin, Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen and Franz From founded what is often referred to as ***The Copenhagen School of Phenomenology***. We invite all participants for the ICNAP meeting of 2023 to be part of this tradition of phenomenology in Copenhagen.

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Schedule for ICNAP XIII

Corpus Crisis

All times are EDT; for help with time zone conversions see: www.worldtimebuddy.com
 All sessions held via Zoom (link is at the top of each day's schedule).

Wednesday, June 1

<https://duq.zoom.us/j/99003567207>

Time	Session
8:00 am - 8:05 am	Zoom Room Opens
8:05 am - 8:15 am	Welcome to ICNAP XIII
8:15 am - 8:40 am	<u>Husserliana Session</u> : Michael Barber, moderator <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sebastian Luft (Philosophy, Marquette University)
8:40 am - 9:20 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frederick J. Wertz (Psychology, Fordham University)
9:20 am - 9:30 am	Break
9:30 am - 10:00 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jacob Rump (Philosophy, Creighton University)
10:00 am - 10:30 am	<u>Discussants</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roberta De Monticelli (Philosophy, San Raffaele University) • Larry Davidson (Psychiatry, Yale University) • Emanuele Caminada (Philosophy, Husserl-Archives Leuven: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy)
10:30 am - 11:00 am	<u>Round Table Discussion</u> (all Husserliana participants)
11:00 am - 11:30 am	Lunch/Dinner and optional continuation of Round Table Discussion
11:30 am - 12:30 pm	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frederik M. Bjerregaard-Nielsen (Psychology, University of Copenhagen) <i>On the Ontology of Language: A Critique of Trait Theory</i> • Michael Mookie Manalili (Psychology, Philosophy, Social Work, Boston College) <i>Interpreting-Flesh of Trauma: Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Memory Neuroscience, and Traumatic Experience</i>
12:30 pm - 12:40 pm	Break
12:40 pm - 1:40 pm	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Daniel Neumann (Philosophy, University of Klagenfurt) <i>Beyond the Physical Body: Hedwig Conrad-Martius's theory of representation</i> • Daniel Adsett (Philosophy, American University in Bulgaria) <i>Self, Others, and the Phenomenology of Incentives</i>

1:40 pm - 1:50 pm

Break

1:50 pm - 2:50 pm

Paper Session

- **Rawb Leon-Carlyl** (Philosophy, Penn State University)
Wild Being and the World of Night
- **Lawrence Berger** (Philosophy, The New School for Social Research)
Attention and Self-Awareness

2:50 pm - 3:00 pm

Break

3:00 pm - 4:15 pm

Panel

Heterogeneity in the Framing of Phenomenological Research

- **Stephen Yanchar** (Psychology and Technology, Brigham Young University)
- **Mary Beth Morrissey** (Law, Health Care, Social Work, Yeshiva University)
- **Amy Fisher-Smith** (Psychology, University of Dallas)
- **Michael Barber** (Philosophy and African-American Studies, Saint Louis University)

Thursday, June 2

<https://duq.zoom.us/j/99003567207>

Time	Session
8:15 am - 8:45 am	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Magnus Englander (Psychology, Malmö University) <i>The qualitative interview in phenomenological psychological research</i>
8:45 am - 9:00 am	Break
9:00 am - 10:20 am	<u>Featured Keynote Address</u> <i>Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Health and Illness</i> Talia Welsh (UTAA Distinguished Service Professor & UC Foundation Professor, Department of Philosophy & Religion; Women, Gender, & Sexuality Studies, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga)
10:20 am - 10:30 am	Break
10:30 am - 11:30 am	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Isabel Sidenius (Psychology, University of Copenhagen) <i>Finding Truth in Fiction</i>• Benedikte Kudahl (Psychology, University of Copenhagen) <i>Phenomenology of Beauty</i>
11:30 am - 12:00 pm	Lunch/Dinner
12:30 pm - 1:30 pm	<u>Paper session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Will W. Adams (Psychology, Duquesne University) <i>Earth's Body - Our Body - Our Beloved's Body: Merleau-Ponty and Zen in Therapeutic Response to the Crisis of Corpus</i>• Luann Fortune (Mind-Body Medicine, Saybrook University) <i>Somatics for Applied Phenomenology Research</i>
1:30 pm - 1:40 pm	Break
1:40 pm - 3:00 pm	<u>Keynote Address</u> <i>Co-hosted by ICNAP & the Department of Psychology, Duquesne University</i> <i>Situating Phenomenological Psychopathology: Lessons from Binswanger's Case of Ellen West</i> Liz Pienkos (Psychology, Clarkson University) <u>Discussants:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pavan Brar (Clinical Psychology, Duquesne University)• Anthony V. Fernandez (Applied Philosophy, Danish Institute for Advanced Study & Department of Sports Science and Clinical Biomechanics, University of Southern Denmark)

Friday, June 3

<https://duq.zoom.us/j/99003567207>

Time	Session
8:15 am - 9:00 am	<u>Husserliana Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Philipp Berghofer (Philosophy, University of Graz)
9:00 am - 9:45 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hannes Wendler (Philosophy/Psychology, Universities of Cologne and Heidelberg) with an introduction by Thiemo Breyer (Philosophy, Husserl Archives, Cologne)
9:45 am - 10:00 am	Break
10:00 am - 10:45 am	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tom Nenon (Philosophy, University of Memphis)
10:45 am - 11:15 am	<u>Discussants</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Thiemo Breyer (Philosophy, Husserl Archives in Cologne)• Eugene DeRobertis (Psychology, Brookdale College)• Michael Barber (Philosophy and African-American Studies, St. Louis University)
11:15 am - 11:30 am	Break
11:30 am - 12:00 pm	<u>Round Table Discussion</u> (all Husserliana participants)
12:00 pm - 12:30 pm	Lunch/Dinner and optional continuation of Round Table Discussion
12:30 pm - 1:30 pm	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Richard Wilson (Philosophy/Computer Science, Towson University) <i>Husserl and The Mathematization of Race</i>• Chen Feng (Philosophy, Kingston University) <i>The Given and the Giving: The Phenomenological Reduction of Husserlian Phenomenology in Emmanuel Levinas</i>
1:30 pm - 1:45 pm	Break
1:45 pm - 2:45 pm	<u>Paper Session</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Randall Johnson (Psychiatry, Private Practice) <i>Inspired Carnal Exegesis: Thinking at the Liminality of Phenomenology and Critique</i>• Michelle Meeks (Philosophy, Penn State University) <i>Theorizing the Subjectivity of the Colonial Child with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Frantz Fanon</i>
2:45 pm - 3:00 pm	Break
3:00 pm - 4:45 pm	<u>Featured Panel: Fanon, Phenomenology, and Psychology</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Leswin Laubscher (Psychology, Duquesne University Extraordinary Professor of Psychology, University of the Western Cape, South Africa)• Derek Hook (Psychology, Duquesne University & Extraordinary Professor of Psychology, University of South Pretoria, South Africa)• Miraj U. Desai (Psychiatry, Yale University)

How to participate in a Zoom Meeting during the Conference

Step 1 – Download Zoom App

Before joining a Zoom meeting on a computer or mobile device, you can download the Zoom app from <https://zoom.us/download>. This link will take you to “Zoom client For Meetings” – click on download to open app. This is Not a Zoom account and you do not need a Zoom account to join a meeting. You are now set to begin.


Step 2 – Joining a Meeting

To join a meeting, simply click on the Join Zoom meeting link (<https://duq.zoom.us/j/99003567207>) and follow the prompts. We suggest that you sign in about 10 minutes early to address any problems that might arise.

Step 3 – Overview – When you have joined the Meeting

When you join a Zoom meeting hosted by another user, you are considered an Attendee.

When on a PC, the attendee controls appear at the bottom of your screen. When using a MAC, the attendee controls appear at the top of the screen.




Attendees have access to these features: from left to right:

To see the tool bar, click on the screen


1. **Mute / Unmute:** Mute and unmute your microphone – click on this icon to unmute to talk, mute to silence your microphone. Please do not unmute yourself during the talk.
2. **Start Video / Stop Video:** Turns your camera on or off – this means that if you want, you can turn off video if you do not want others to see you, however you will still be able to see the program.
3. **Participants:** See who’s currently in the meeting. Click on icon and a list of participants will appear on the right side of the screen.
4. **Share Screen:** You can share your own screen – this function will be activated for presenters.
5. **Chat:** Access the chat window to submit questions of the speaker (Ask a Question). Click on chat icon. Chat will open at the right of the screen. Go to bottom and see – type message – write your message and hit the enter button on your computer.
6. **Record:** Attendees do not have access to this function
7. **Leave:** You can leave the meeting at any time even while it continues for the other participants. To do so, click on LEAVE and follow prompts.

Using the Chat function to Ask Questions

1. Select the "Chat" button at the bottom of your screen




2. If the session has a moderator, from the drop-down menu direct message the session moderator.



Another way to ask a question using the Chat function:



1. Click the in the top right corner of the window for the session moderator and select “Chat” to send the moderator a direct message




Changing the Video Layout

During the talks, you will see the presentation in the middle of the screen and the participants at the top. When a presentation is finished, the mode switches back to the “Gallery view”. Here you can see all the participants in small tiles. The person who is speaking is bordered in green. In Zoom you have the option to display the speaking person as large.

You can change the video layout by clicking on the view symbol in the top-right corner.

Speaker view: Speaker view will switch the large video window between who is speaking in the meeting.

Gallery view: Gallery view lets you see thumbnail displays of participants, in a grid pattern, which expands and contracts as participants join and leave the meeting



If you encounter technical issues please contact: Jane Baker (jbaker@brocku.ca) or Sabrina Bungash (bungashs@duq.edu).

Abstracts of Special Sessions

Husserliana Sessions

Husserl's Research Manuscript:

"The Paradox of the Psychological Reduction.

The Antinomy of the Psychological Epoché.

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Husserl's text focuses on the method of phenomenological psychology, which follows from the essence of the psychological, something Husserl struggled with his entire career. More broadly, this issue is embedded in the problem of the relationship between philosophy and psychology, indeed transcendental phenomenology and the positive sciences, among which Husserl considered psychology "the decisive field." For ICNAP this problem is especially significant because Husserl considered psychology not merely the science of individual mental life but as foundational for the cultural/human sciences--such sciences of persons as anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, history, and even the humanities--theology and investigations into art, architecture, literature, technology, and cultural objects/institutions. Closely related to this "paradox" is also the problem of psychologism and more generally relativism as well as the securing of an absolute ground for philosophy, indeed the relation of the transcendental philosophy to mundane life.

Wednesday June 1:

- **Sebastian Luft** (Philosophy, Marquette University)
- **Frederick J. Wertz** (Psychology, Fordham University)
- **Jacob Rump** (Philosophy, Creighton University)
- **Roberta De Monticelli** (Philosophy, San Raffaele University)
- **Larry Davidson** (Psychiatry, Yale University)
- **Emanuele Caminada** (Philosophy, Husserl-Archives Leuven: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy)

Friday June 3:

- **Philipp Berghofer** (Philosophy, University of Graz)
- **Hannes Wendler** (Philosophy/Psychology, Universities of Cologne and Heidelberg)
- **Tom Nenon** (Philosophy, University of Memphis)
- **Thiemo Breyer** (Philosophy, Husserl Archives in Cologne)
- **Eugene DeRobertis** (Psychology, Brookdale College)
- **Michael Barber** (Philosophy and African-American Studies, St. Louis University)

Keynote Address: Thursday, June 2, 9:00am

Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Health & Illness

Talia Welsh

UTAA Distinguished Service Professor & UC Foundation Professor, Department of Philosophy & Religion; Women, Gender, & Sexuality Studies, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

In this paper, I summarize how phenomenologies of health and illness view health as a background state of capacity and equilibrium. Yet, our current wealth of medical and corporate medicines, products, practices, and procedures designed to benefit our health requires conscious deliberate action and consumption. Thus, the things we do *for* health are distinct phenomenologically from a *state* of health. With Husserl's account of the crisis of the sciences, we find that while we benefit from the progress of the health care sciences, we do not experience the "truth" of the sciences directly. We find, following Hannah Arendt's discussion of the collapse of authority, an investment in the value of health but not in the authority of medical professionals. I suggest that a certain view of science's *objectivity* is part of the issue that contributes paradoxically to selective rejections of well-founded public health recommendations.

Talia Welsh is UTAA Distinguished Service Professor & UC Foundation Professor of Philosophy and Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. She translated Merleau-Ponty's lectures in child psychology and pedagogy in the volume *Child Psychology & Pedagogy: Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne* (Northwestern University Press, 2010) and is the author of the book *The Child as Natural Phenomenologist: Primal and Primary Experience in Merleau-Ponty's Psychology* (Northwestern University Press, 2013). She co-edited with Susan Bredlau— *Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau-Ponty* published with SUNY Press this year (2022). Her most recent book, *Feminist Existentialism, Biopolitics, and Critical Phenomenology in a Time of Bad Health*, also appeared this year with Routledge.

Keynote Address: Thursday, June 2, 1:40pm

Situating phenomenological psychopathology: Lessons from Binswanger's The Case of Ellen West

Elizabeth Pienkos
Clarkson University

Recent advances in phenomenological theories of schizophrenia have offered detailed descriptions of the disturbances in self-experience and the lived world that characterize this condition, presenting an important corrective to biomedical psychiatry. However, much of this work can be taken to imply that alterations are primarily located within an isolated individual, while it has been clearly demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between traumatic and stressful life events and the development of schizophrenia, suggesting that the life situation is highly relevant for many people diagnosed with this disorder. This presentation draws on foundational texts in phenomenology to advocate for including life events and their subjective meaning as *essential* aspects of this disorder. To illustrate the importance of this approach, I will discuss a foundational text in the history of phenomenological psychiatry, Binswanger's *Case of Ellen West*, which was originally diagnosed as a "hopeless" case of schizophrenia. I will also suggest that interpretations suggested by feminist phenomenology help to see the limits and limitations of both historical and contemporary phenomenological analyses of this case. Ellen West's case clearly demonstrates the importance of contemporary phenomenology in diagnosis and treatment, as well as the need to expand the methods and theories on which it is founded.

Dr. Liz Pienkos is a licensed clinical psychologist and an assistant professor of psychology at Clarkson University in Potsdam, New York. She studied under Louis Sass at Rutgers University and received her Psy.D. in 2014. Her research focuses on the phenomenology of schizophrenia, using qualitative methods to explore the mechanisms and features of this and other psychiatric disorders. Recent studies have investigated experiences of depersonalization/derealization disorder as well as experiential changes associated with the pandemic.

Featured Panel: Friday, June 3, 3:00pm

Fanon, Phenomenology, and Psychology

- **Leswin Laubscher**
Psychology, Duquesne University & Extraordinary Professor of Psychology, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
- **Derek Hook**
Psychology, Duquesne University & Extraordinary Professor of Psychology, University of South Pretoria, South Africa
- **Miraj U. Desai**
Psychiatry, Yale University

Fanon, Phenomenology, and Psychology is the first edited collection dedicated to exploring the explicitly phenomenological foundations underlying Frantz Fanon's most important insights. Featuring contributions from many of the world's leading scholars on Fanon, this volume foregrounds a series of crucial phenomenological topics – inclusive of the domains of experience, structure, embodiment, and temporality – pertaining to the analysis and interrogation of racism and anti-Blackness. Chapters highlight and expand Fanon's ongoing importance to the discipline of psychology while opening compelling new perspectives on psychopathology, decolonial praxis, racialized time, whiteness, Black subjectivity, the "racial ontologizing of the body," systematic structures of racism and resulting forms of trauma, Black Consciousness, and Africana phenomenology. In an era characterized by resurgent forms of anti-Blackness and racism, this book is essential reading for students, scholars, and activists who remain inspired by Fanon's legacy.

Dr. Leswin Laubscher counts teaching, research, and clinical experience as a psychologist in both the United States and South Africa. He holds degrees from Northwestern University in Evanston, and the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Recent research interests and publications have examined the intersection of culture and psychology, apartheid and psychology, and the importance of the philosophies of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and Frantz Fanon for psychology. Dr. Laubscher serves as the current chairperson of the psychology department at Duquesne. He has also held honorary and external appointments in addition to that at Duquesne, for example at the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa, and currently as Extraordinary Professor at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Derek Hook is a scholar and a practitioner of psychoanalysis with expertise in the areas of Lacanian psychoanalysis, post-colonial theory (the work of Frantz Fanon in particular), the psychology of racism and critical social psychology. Derek has taught classes on Lacanian clinical and social theory in a variety of global and organizational from South Africa (University of the Witwatersrand, University of Pretoria) to the UK (Birkbeck College at the University of London, London School of Economics) and the US (Duquesne University) over the last 20 years. In addition to his Duquesne appointment, Derek is an Extraordinary Professor of Psychology at the University of Pretoria and South Africa. He teaches an annual summer class on Lacanian Psychoanalysis in the Department of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck College at the University of London. He was the recipient of International Social Research Foundation grant in 2015. He has twice been awarded a Loogman Grant from the Center for African Studies at Duquesne University (for research on the anti-apartheid Africanist intellectual and political leader Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe), and he received a the McNulty College Award for excellence in research in 2016.

Miraj U. Desai, PhD is an Assistant Professor at the Program for Recovery and Community Health of the Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. At Yale, he is also a Resident Fellow of Pierson College, Affiliated Faculty in the Center on Climate Change and Health (Yale School of Public Health), and a Member of the South Asian Studies Council. He has been at Yale since 2011, completing his predoctoral and postdoctoral fellowships, prior to joining the faculty in 2015. His research focuses on cultural, community, and social justice perspectives on mental health. Dr. Desai is a recipient of the Melba J.T. Vasquez Early Career Award for Distinguished Contributions (American Psychological Association Minority Fellowship Program); the Distinguished Early Career Contributions in Qualitative Inquiry Award (APA Division of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods); and the Sidney Jourard Award (APA Society for Humanistic Psychology). He is a Minority Fellow of the APA and was named a 40 Under 40 Leader in Health by the National Minority Quality Forum. Dr. Desai is an avid practitioner of Zen and is proficient in Gujarati, French, and Hindi.

Session Abstracts: in order of session schedule

June 1st, 2022

On the Ontology of Language: A Critique of Trait Theory

Frederik M. Bjerregaard-Nielsen

(Psychology, University of Copenhagen)

I wish to present a comparative analysis of the ontological assumptions about language at play within structural linguistics and trait theory in order to show a fundamental congeniality. I highlight that, whereas de Saussure discusses the ontological boundaries of his conception of language, this question is hardly raised within trait theory despite its fundamental dependence on the resources of natural language in the extraction of the proposed personality traits, whether there are five or six.

These analyses demonstrate an important incongruence between trait theory's aim of description and its assumptions about language. This finding guides a broader analysis of the structuring effect of the ontology of language within the study of subjectivity, in which the schism between subject and structure, interpretation and formalization, becomes apparent. I raise the question: What are the fundamental characteristics of language and what should be accentuated in a psychology that purports to study subjectivity? To this end, I engage with phenomenology of language and the lived body. I further develop the proposition that an integrative reading of structural linguistics and the phenomenology of speaking can be a constructive way to think coherently about language as system and language as subjectivity by insisting on speech as a corporeal intention and reference and, thereby, lived.

Interpreting-Flesh of Trauma: Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Memory Neuroscience, and Traumatic Experience

Michael Mookie Manalili

(Psychology, Philosophy, Social Work, Boston College)

- “What the mind has forgotten, the body has not... thankfully.”
– Sigmund Freud
- “Time in its passage does not... close up on traumatic experience.”
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty
- “Differing radically from both the “cold” declarative and the “warm” episode memories, implicit memories... arise as a collage of sensations, emotions, and behaviors.”
– Peter Levine

As psychotherapists, we offer space for folks to re-interpret and re-constitute the experiences of their lives. However, what happens in the face of experiences that elude descriptions – either from the oversaturating flood of excess or the yawning gap of lack?

In this presentation, we explore how traumatic experiences are interpreted by our flesh. First, we begin with hermeneutic phenomenology, particularly of carnal hermeneutics and the interpretation of our flesh (prior even to cognition). Second, we continue by linking this discourse with research on memory neuroscience, particularly how different forms of memory are function ((a) explicit – declarative and

episodic, (b) implicit – procedural and emotional). Finally, we analyze the rupture of our narrativity: traumatic experience. As such, we draw from the works of Merleau-Ponty, Kearney, Levine, and others. The hope herein is to practice more ethically and think more humanely as we explore the phenomena of trauma. Practitioners and researchers alike should be careful when descriptively exploring memories, as some might be tied to engrams with triggering actions patterns (especially in the case of traumatic memory). Yet due to the malleability of memory, there is always hope for embodied interpretations of futures towards healing and empowerment.

Beyond the Physical Body: Hedwig Conrad-Martius's theory of representation

Daniel Neumann

(Philosophy, University of Klagenfurt)

As one of the most original contributions to early phenomenology, the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius remains little known today. In my proposed talk, I want to focus on her theory of representation which blurs the line between perception, imagination and representation. Reality, in the phenomenology of Conrad-Martius, is not in the first place a matter of a perceptual encounter between I and world, but an affection which reaches beyond questions of sensuous certainty.

Self, Others, and the Phenomenology of Incentives

Daniel Adsett

(Philosophy, American University in Bulgaria)

Incentives appear in many areas of our lives. They show up in our day-to-day affairs when they compel us, for example, to donate parts of our income in order to receive tax credits (positive incentives) or to drive below the speed limit in order to avoid a ticket (negative incentives). And while there are incentives in nearly every area of our lives, they are particularly prominent in the business world. But though economists have studied incentives for many years, relatively few philosophers have examined them in depth. To help make up for this deficit, in this paper I will analyze the structure of incentives from a phenomenological point of view. Drawing from the work of Edmund Husserl and several of his interpreters, I will investigate the phenomenological structure of incentives -- how they bring the incentivizer and the incentivized together; how they invite the incentivized to imagine a world with the incentive; how the incentivized is led to relate to those around her -- and I will outline ways in which changes to incentives, how they are offered, and to whom they are offered strongly affect the way the incentivized understands her relation to others and the world.

Wild Being and the World of Night

Rawb Leon-Carlyl

(Philosophy, Penn State University)

In this paper I use a phenomenology of low-light vision to shed a little light on Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of wild Being and the chiasm. The perceived world changes radically in darkness – and yet this world remains the world for us. Just as we use two eyes to form one engagement with the world, we rely on two distinct sets of photoreceptors in order to engage with two different worlds – daylight and night – that nevertheless remain one perceived world. To elucidate our experience of night, I engage with two empirical fields concerned with scotopic vision: nyctalopia (“night-blindness”) and the Purkinje effect (the shift in our perception of hues in low-light). I then elaborate how these two fields of study are informed and exceeded by our lived experience of the body at night. We can illuminate Merleau-

Ponty's later ontology with these experiences by A) noting the chiasmic structure of daylight and nighttime vision; B) noting that a singular color can serve as a universal light in both bright light and low-light; and C) placing the naming of colored objects at odds with the differences in color and low-light vision. By understanding our various forms of vision as fields of differentiation in and for the perceived world, we can overcome the Cartesian ontology of subject-object-relation. By recognizing the multiplicity of visions within ourselves, we may better speak to wild Being as that perceived world that calls to us differently in the day than it does the night.

Attention and Self-Awareness

Lawrence Berger

(Philosophy, The New School for Social Research)

I argue that attention is my presence in the world, which in turn is the basis for pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. That presence moves according to a hermeneutical circle of attention, language, and bodily understanding, where the latter directs attention, the deliverances of which form the understanding and its associated terms, and where language is shared understanding that develops by way of shared attention. In this manner, my bodily sensibilities and capacities are brought to bear in the course of engagement by way of attention, which makes the resulting presence mine.

On this basis I distinguish between reflective and explicit self-awareness. Reflective awareness comes about by way of a fissure between the reflecting and reflected, while explicit self-awareness comes about by way of staying with the movement of attention in the course of worldly engagement, thereby unifying it with the lived body-environment in which it operates. Unlike pre-reflective self-awareness, which is not accessible to others, we can sense each others bodily presence and be explicitly aware of ourselves in so doing; and we can be more or less present, more or less integrated depending on the extent to which we stay with our own presence together, which can translate into ontological bonds between members of communities. Thus, rather than assuming the existence of transcendental structures which ensure synchronic and diachronic unification and intersubjective bonds, I argue that the extent of self- and communal integration depends upon the state of attention.

Heterogeneity in the Framing of Phenomenological Research

Stephen Yanchar

(Psychology and Technology, Brigham Young University)

Mary Beth Morrissey

(Law, Health Care, Social Work, Yeshiva University)

Amy Fisher-Smith

(Psychology, University of Dallas)

Michael Barber

(Philosophy and African-American Studies, Saint Louis University)

The aim of this panel will be to feature phenomenology as an unfolding historical achievement, highlighting epistemic access to unique or evolving phenomenological positions or variations on the theme of phenomenology within different disciplines. Presenters from several disciplines (1. Mary Beth Morrissey from public health, social work and law; 2. Scott Churchill and Amy Fisher Smith from psychology; 3. Michael Barber from philosophy; and 4. Stephen Yanchar from psychology and education) will draw upon the work of philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Charles Taylor, Lester Embree, and John Drummond to foster a discussion regarding the diversity of phenomenological positions within the social sciences and humanities. The specific themes addressed will include (1) Practice of phenomenology in

the maternal attitude and in paradigmatic example of humanitarian crisis; (2) Empathy as epistemic access to the other in both qualitative research and clinical psychology, and the transformative impact of empathic presence on the participant as well as the researcher; (3) Phenomenological analysis of African American folklore humor; and (4) Engaging phenomenology as formal indication. Each of the four presentations will take 20 minutes, leaving 40 minutes (in a two hour session) for discussion.

June 2nd, 2022

The Qualitative Interview in Phenomenological Psychological Research

Magnus Englander

(Psychology, Malmö University)

The purpose of this paper is to address some key theoretical issues relevant for a phenomenological approach to interviewing, and to contextualize this methodology within the research tradition of American phenomenological psychology as it was developed at Duquesne University. Psychological qualitative interviewing will be presented as a possibility for an overall qualitative research design and methodology, and historically understood within the horizon of third force psychology and the overall qualitative research movement in the human sciences. Working from such a historical background, a brief reply to a recent, misguided critique is presented, a critique in which the phenomenological psychological interview is portrayed as passive. As part of this reply, some recent developments of the interview as contextualized within a human science methodology are included, exploring the relationship between the phenomenology of empathy, the purpose of ethnography, the methodology of participant observation, and Schutzian phenomenology.

Finding Truth in Fiction

Isabel Sidenius

(Psychology, University of Copenhagen)

I wish to present a research paper that examines how personally significant experiences of reading fiction appears and explores the psychological meanings of these. Giorgi's (2009) descriptive phenomenological psychological method has been used and reveals a general structure for this kind of experience consisting of following constituent elements: a) Bodily and affective sensations, b) Immersion, c) Recognition and d) Reflections and imaginings on possibilities. This structure is further investigated through the eyes of Merleau-Ponty (1945/2014), where it is shown that the body must be taken into consideration if we are to understand how we engage with and interpret fiction. Reading is often referred to as an act of interpretation, yet this study shows how interpretation relies on a pre-reflective engagement with the text that must be viewed as a presupposition for a more reflective interpretation. Through the findings, psychological processes such as affectivity, understanding and imagination appeared to be particularly central in the way the subject engages with fiction, and these are thus discussed drawing on Merleau-Ponty (1945/2014), Casey (2000) and Gadamer (1960/2007) as well as the empirical material. The paper concludes that through the reading experience, the subject recognizes something both familiar and unfamiliar, which paves the way for an alteration of subjectivity by way of providing a new understanding of oneself, others, and the world. It can be described as the subject's experience of getting in touch with a truth -- a truth that lies in the connection between reader and text revealing something meaningful about both in the encounter.

Phenomenology of Beauty

Benedikte Kudahl

(Psychology, University of Copenhagen)

Beauty is a slippery, seemingly self-referential concept. The notion of beauty, in Greek kalos, refers to that which is aesthetically good. However, explaining beauty as good, and in turn, explaining the aesthetically good as beautiful leaves us empty-handed; abandoned within a metaphysical loop. Thus, to know what beauty is, we would have to break the self-referential system of kalos by asking: how does the beautiful, in its splendor and goodness, actually appear?

Through in-depth interviews with spectators of art, I explore how beauty appears to human consciousness. The analysis draws on Amedeo Giorgi's phenomenological psychological approach. In my presentation, I will describe my empirical findings and a possible outline of beauty's experiential structure.

My analysis suggests that beauty appears within a particular temporal structure that organizes different modes of perceptual givenness. Specifically, beauty seems to appear as the relationship between two modes of givenness, one of which necessarily proceeds the other. The first mode is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the perceptual plunge in which the spectator steps into the artwork and hardly distinguishes herself or her own perception from the artwork. Within the second mode, the spectator reflects on the immediate past and realizes the loss of the perceptual plunge. Beauty experience, the analysis suggests, is given as this relation.

Earth's Body - Our Body - Our Beloved's Body:

Merleau-Ponty and Zen in Therapeutic Response to the Crisis of Corpus

Will W. Adams

(Psychology, Duquesne University)

For this timely conference on the crisis of our embodied or all-too-often (apparently) dis-embodied lives, the call for papers posed a crucial question: Whose body or what "kinds" of embodiment? In our era of ecological desecration, injustice, and destruction, the body of the animate earth deserves special attention and care -- this uniquely precious body along with other wounded, glorious, precious bodies that are each inseparably and inter-responsively involved with it. The presentation I am proposing will explore how today's dominant culture -- so often lost in confusion, fear, and greed -- is afflicting us with kindred somatic/psychological/spiritual dissociations: That is, we often feel separate or estranged from our own personal body, from the whole body(self) of other people and the local human community, and from the infinitely deep dynamic body of the sentient-sapient earth. Global warming, mass extinction, habitat destruction, and toxic environments are symptoms of this grave dissociation, as are the escalating sense of lack, anxiety, depression, and meaninglessness that arise when we abdicate our conscious contact with the more-than-human natural world. Contemplated together, the phenomenological perspectives of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Zen Buddhism can provide pathways for healing our traumatized bodies and cultivating embodied relational awareness, wisdom, compassion, love, and justice. Key textual passages will be placed into dialogue with vivid descriptions from actual lived experience.

Somatics for Applied Phenomenology Research

Luann Fortune

(Mind-Body Medicine, Saybrook University)

This proposed presentation is grounded in the premise that phenomenological inquiry is essentially non-dual and phenomenology researchers are somatic beings. Through intentionality and applied embodiment methods, the phenomenological researcher can cultivate whole-bodied presence and participation beginning with explicating somatic awareness. This presentation will report on a conceptual model and experiential methods for incorporating embodiment techniques into phenomenology research, as well as outcomes associated with executing the methods described. Discussions that affirm the sentient body in reflection and exploration are abundant in phenomenology literature. Applying a hermeneutic lens, somatic phenomenology reasons that the physical body is ever-present in scholarship and executing original research. This presentation describes approaches and techniques that have been used effectively in applied interdisciplinary research using phenomenology as methodology. To support embodied research as praxis, this presentation will offer a practical framework for cultivating embodiment techniques. The examples have been documented in the literature through articles and published dissertations. Those interested in introducing embodiment into research are offered various tactics based on previously executed research. The embodiment techniques described can promote authenticity by ascribing primacy to the researcher's and participants' somatic perceptions and experiences and are particularly valuable for inquiries related to health and wellness.

June 3rd, 2022

Husserl and The Mathematization of Race

Richard Wilson

(Philosophy/Computer Science, Towson University)

The insights introduced in Husserl's "The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" present a framework for developing ideas that can go far beyond the scope of Husserl's original work. What Husserl develops in this work is an account or interpretation of how a method introduced by Galileo, what he refers to as the mathematization of nature, has led to the development of a series of levels of abstraction that have divorced the sciences from the lived experience of human existence. According to Husserl the mathematization of nature has led to the loss of the meaning of lived experience and to the abstractions which were originally a product of human lived experience. What occurs as a result is the development of a series of levels of abstraction where a method has been substituted for the lived experience of those who developed the series of abstractions.

These ideas have a direct relation to how platform technologies function. What is the relationship between emerging technology and the future structure of our economy? This analysis is aimed at showing how contemporary innovations in automation, cybernetics and manufacturing represent a theoretical and practical challenge to the very economic system that bred them. Through the analysis of platform technologies this analysis focuses on describing how platform technologies such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon work according to software that has been developed according to Husserl's conception of the mathematization and through an extension of these ideas the digitization of nature.

The results of this mathematization and digitization of nature is easily seen in the development of online platforms such as Zoom used in education. Zoom conditions the lived experience of the users of the platforms and conditions through the extension of Husserl's notion of the mathematization of nature how users interact with one another and ultimately how they learn to think.

*The Given and the Giving: The Phenomenological Reduction
of Husserlian Phenomenology in Emmanuel Levinas*

Chen Feng

(Philosophy, Kingston University)

Is the appearance of phenomenology, among us who were born dogmatic, a problem for phenomenology? This question will serve as a guideline for this paper. "We are led to effectuate the reduction because we can, and because it opens a new field of knowledge." Does not the appearance of phenomenology, among us who were born dogmatic, constitute a new phenomenon in the realm of consciousness? Levinas continued this trajectory and developed a phenomenological reduction of Husserlian phenomenology in *Totality and Infinity*. It will be shown that Levinas' relationship to Husserlian phenomenology is much more than a critique. The given is by itself the giving. Strictly within the phenomenological attitude, the giving is not only as primordial as the given, but also chronologically conditions the given. The fact that intentionality is "given" has a meaning that a meaning that is "metaphysically important for the essence of our life" and needs to be addressed.

*Inspired Carnal Exegesis: Thinking at the Liminality of
Phenomenology and Critique*

Randall Johnson

(Psychiatry, Private Practice)

This essay to think at the liminality of phenomenology and critique occasions three instances of exploration. First, a brief polemic on the phrase critical phenomenology; second, a close reading of Merleau-Ponty's chiasm chapter as an exemplar of carnal exegesis; and third, a focus on two passages of Hortense Spillers' thinking flesh as an exemplar of what I call critique that does not abjure experiential knowings. Critique needs a phenomenologically nuanced grasp of experiential knowings to avoid becoming just another ideology folded back onto discursive knowledge, and phenomenology needs a critically nuanced grasp of situational dissensus to address politics in the singular-plural, all-too-human world. Merleau-Ponty and Spillers think at these liminalities of flesh/body and singular/plural. For both phenomenology and critique, this is the locus of thinking that has the possibility to express an ethos for living that does not become theology or fall back into ideology.

*Theorizing the Subjectivity of the Colonial Child with
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Frantz Fanon*

Michelle Meeks

(Philosophy, Penn State University)

This talk interrogates some of Merleau-Ponty's claims on childhood in *Phenomenology of Perception* while emphasizing the principles he develops that are necessary to take seriously the child figure structured by coloniality. I do not spend time criticizing Merleau-Ponty for his complacency with Eurocentrism, colonialism, racism, and heterosexism. Rather, I examine the essential generative insights decolonial theorists can draw from Merleau-Ponty when examining the relationship between coloniality

and the child figure. I contextualize my reading of Merleau-Ponty with a reading of Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) to begin theorizing the subjectivity of the colonial child figure. Frantz Fanon's conception of childhood and the child figure fills in some of the gaps Merleau-Ponty's child psychology leaves behind, reversing the exclusionary tendencies embedded within Phenomenology by disrupting the universalized notions of childhood of Western modernity. I explore the lived experience of the child figure within a colonial regime. I conceptualize two distinct subjectivities (the colonizing and colonized child figure) and how they are vulnerable to pathological behavior conditioned by the colonial regime. As a global phenomenon, I argue that coloniality has restructured and pathologized the universalized conception of the child figure.



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